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Abstract
This paper illustrates the di￿culty in disentangling the underlying channels
of intergenerational earnings persistence by means of path analysis and recur-
sive models. On closer examination, these models manifest their shortcomings
as regards accounting for how parental earnings have a direct impact on their
o￿spring’s earnings, but also have an e￿ect through other factors such as edu-
cation, skills and health. The estimated e￿ects of these mediating factors are
likely to capture the in￿uence of other mechanisms not taken into account in
the analysis. Nonetheless, the results suggest that education is the most impor-
tant mechanism in the earnings transmission process, although it is sensitive
to the inclusion of other covariates and the order in which these are entered
into the equation. Nonlinear speci￿cations suggest that the e￿ect of a father’s
earnings on his son’s has the greatest impact primarily through education and
IQ in the upper middle categories of the earnings distribution of the fathers,
while health status is of secondary importance.
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The transmission of socioeconomic status across generations has been a widely exam-
ined subject over the past ￿fteen years.1 So far, extensive literature has uncovered
various pattern of intergenerational earnings persistence in several countries. The
Nordic countries, for instance, have been found to have a higher level of intergenera-
tional mobility and consequently a low persistence of inequality compared to the U.S.
Still, little is known about the underlying factors that contribute to the inheritance
of position of parents in the earnings distribution.
A further step in the study of the persistence of inequality is therefore to discern
potential channels through which economic advantages and disadvantages are passed
on from one generation to another. Parental in￿uence on children’s earnings operate
through various channels. The acquistion of human capital such as education is one of
the most evident channel through which family backgrounds a￿ect the adult earnings
of the o￿spring.
The use of path analysis in empirical studies on intergenerational transmission
of earnings is consistent with the Becker-Tomes (1979, 1986) theoretical framework,
from which two di￿erent e￿ects characterizing the intergenerational earnings linkage
can be derived: a direct e￿ect of the parents’ economic status on the o￿spring’s future
earnings, and an indirect e￿ect through the parents’ investment in their children’s
education. Fundamentally, these two e￿ects are captured by the typical measures
of intergenerational economic association. A seemingly appealing approach is to
estimate a recursive model in which parental earnings not only have a direct impact
on the o￿spring’s earnings but they also have an impact via other factors such as
education. Among the handful of contemporary studies that implement this approach
is Eide and Showalter (1999) who use U.S. data, and ￿nd that education accounts
for almost a third of the relationship between a father’s and son’s earnings.2 Also
for the U.K., Blanden, Gregg and Macmillan (2007), applying a similar approach,
￿nd that education is a major contributor to the intergenerational persistence of
economic status with nearly 46 percent of earnings resemblance between fathers and
sons accounted for.
Studies have shown a direct link between poor health and lower productivity in
the labour market (Case, Fertig and Paxson, 2005). Likewise, the impact of physical
status on educational achievement may also have an indirect impact on labour pro-
ductivity. As the parents’ investment in their children’s well-being also involves caring
for their health, the transmission of earnings is concerned with the impact of child
health on future adult earnings. Eriksson, Bratsberg and Raaum (2005) use Dan-
ish youth cohort data to examine the importance of health as a mechanism through
1For recent overviews, see Corak (2006) and Bj￿ orklund and J￿ antti (2009).
2￿ Osterbacka (2001) also examines the importance of education as a channel using a variance
decomposition technique.
2which intergenerational economic transmission takes place. Their results show that
health status accounts for 28 percent of the father-son earnings relationship.
Earlier research has established that skills such as cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities, which are highly associated with family circumstances, largely determine an
individual’s labour earnings and contribute to the transmission of inequality across
generations (Osborne Groves, 2005). Although education is primarily designed to
promote cognitive development, it has been shown that non-cognitive skills such
as motivation, persistence and dependability are important predictors of students’
academic grades and valuable assets in the labour market (Carneiro and Heckman,
2003). Moreover, there is empirical evidence that environmental factors and parental
ability in￿uence the o￿spring’s non-cognitive ability (Heckman, 2000). In a recent
attempt to disentangle the e￿ects from various transmission factors, Blanden, Gregg
and Macmillan (2007) indicate that cognitive variables have a stronger link with
parental income than non-cognitive variables. They ￿nd that cognitive variables
contribute to 27 percent of the earnings persistence, while non-cognitive skills account
for 19 percent of the intergenerational economic relationship. However, cognitive and
non-cognitive variables account for 32 percent of the earnings persistence when taken
together in the same intergenerational equation.
The main contribution of this paper is to take the previously cited research a stage
further by simultaneously considering several factors underlying the intergenerational
economic linkage, namely education, cognitive and non-cognitive skills, and health,
in one and the same study. Taking the divergent results above as a starting point, I
explore whether it is possible to distinguish between the extent to which these factors
contribute to the persistence of economic status across generations.
Next, I also explore possible nonlinearity when considering the impact of educa-
tion, skills, and health on the intergenerational earnings persistence. Most studies
on intergenerational mobility focus on the average measures of persistence and pro-
vide easily interpretable information about the economic link between parents and
o￿spring. Yet the e￿ect of parental background is not necessarily identical over the
entire earnings distribution. In fact, it is likely that the transmission of economic
status across generations is subject to nonlinearity as suggested by, for instance,
Bratsberg et al. (2007). The adoption of non-parametric methods to estimate more
￿exible models for the relationship between a father’s and his son’s earnings presents
an alternative to the log-linear functional form. Therefore, I apply spline regression
to cast a light on the role of mediating factors at di￿erent stages of the earnings
distribution. Moreover, I include daughters in the analysis and compare the extent of
earnings transmission between sons and daughters with respect to level of education
and ￿eld.
My analysis di￿ers from previous ones by bene￿ting from the use of Swedish
Military Enlistment data. A key advantage of this unique data set is the accurate
records of all Swedish males’ test scores at the age of 18, as well as information
on mental and physical health. Moreover, I have access to a high quality data set
3from Statistics Sweden, which has a number of advantages, among others a large and
representative sample as well as more detailed measures of education such as level
and ￿eld of education.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and econometric framework, Section 3 provides a variable description and outlines
the data used. Section 4 presents the OLS results for the whole sample of sons and
results for sons with a high level of education. The last part of Section 4 includes
results of the nonlinear approach and those from the comparison between sons and
daughters. Section 5 contains a summary of the results and conclusions.
2 Model and econometric framework
The persistence of earnings across generations is captured by the standard model in
intergenerational earning mobility, a regression of the son’ s earnings on those of the
father’s
y
oi = ￿1 + ￿1y
fi + "1i (1)
where yoi and yfi represent the o￿spring’s and the father’s long-run earnings in family
i. The regression coe￿cient of interest ￿1 is the intergenerational elasticity, when
using the logarithm of earnings. It measures the percentage di￿erential in the son’s
log earnings with respect to a marginal percentage change in the log earnings of his
father.
The intergenerational earnings association can be characterized by two e￿ects that
are consistent with the Becker-Tomes theoretical framework. Speci￿cally, there is not
only the direct impact of parental earnings on the o￿spring’s future earnings, but
also an indirect impact through the parents’ investment in their children’s education
(Becker and Tomes, 1979, 1986). The direct e￿ect may capture social norms such as
work ethics, social network e￿ects such as family connections in accessing the labour
market, but it could also consist of wealth transfers. The indirect e￿ect through
education captures for instance the access to education for individuals from di￿erent
family backgrounds. In terms of path analysis, education constitutes a mediating
factor between parental earnings and those of their o￿spring. This relationship can
be represented in two structural equations
S
oi = ’ + ￿yfi + ￿i (2)
y
oi = ￿2 + ￿2y
fi + ￿S
oi + "2i (3)
When estimating the intergenerational equation using the o￿spring’s education
and the father’s earnings as explanatory variables as in equation (3), the purpose is
to obtain a direct e￿ect by isolating the earnings coe￿cient from the indirect e￿ects
4of the father’s earnings via education. However, this decomposition of the direct
and indirect e￿ects requires a relatively strong econometric assumption, which is
di￿cult to test empirically. In particular, in order for the OLS-estimates of the direct
and indirect e￿ects to be identi￿ed, the error terms "2i and ￿i in the two structural
equations must be uncorrelated (Greene, 2000, Chapter 15). Consequently, OLS
applied on (3) would yield inconsistent estimates of the coe￿cient on o￿spring’s
education.
The parental impact on a child’s earnings also operates through various chan-
nels, other than education Soi. In this study, such channels could be the o￿spring’s
cognitive ability IQoi, and non-cognitive abilityPsyoi, as well as health Hoi
IQ
oi = ￿3 + ￿3y
fi + "3i (4)
Psy
oi = ￿4 + ￿4y
fi + "4i (5)
H
oi = ￿5 + ￿5y
fi + "5i (6)
When considering education as the only mediating variable, we have
y
oi = ￿6 + ￿6y
fi + ￿(’ + ￿yfi) + ￿6i (7)
Taking the other transmission mechanisms in (4), (5) and (6) into account, equation
(4) becomes
y
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fi + (￿￿ + ￿1￿3 + ￿2￿4 + ￿3￿5)y
fi + (￿’ + ￿1￿3 + ￿2￿4 + ￿3￿5)
+"6i
(8)
Quantifying the e￿ect attributed to the direct and indirect e￿ects of the father’s
earnings on those of his o￿spring
@yoi
@yfi = ￿6 + (￿￿ + ￿1￿3 + ￿2￿4 + ￿3￿5) (9)
where ￿6 is the direct e￿ect, and the terms in the parentheses constitute the sum of
the indirect e￿ect through the mediating variables; of which ￿￿ is the indirect e￿ect
via education, ￿1￿3 and ￿2￿4 are the indirect e￿ect via cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities respectively. The last term ￿3￿5 represents the indirect e￿ect through health.
The above speci￿cations are based on the assumption that the conditional expec-
tation of the o￿spring’s earnings is linear in the father’s earnings. Although these
speci￿cations provide valuable and easily interpretable results, the e￿ect of parental
background does not need to be identical over the entire earnings distribution. In
5fact, Bratsberg et al. (2007) ￿nd that the intergenerational relationship is subject to
nonlinearity and the degree of economic persistence is therefore likely to di￿er along
with the earnings distribution. Estimating more ￿exible models such as a spline
function can be an alternative to the log-linear functional form.3 A spline regres-
sion is a dummy variable model subject to some continuity restrictions, and allows a
free choice of the knots at which the regression slopes are allowed to change.4 The
percentiles of a father’s earnings serve as endpoints of various ranges in the spline
function
y
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correspond to the 5th and 10th percentiles of the father’s average log earnings yfi,
the dummy variables are d1 = 1 if yfi ￿ y
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This study di￿ers from previous ones by bene￿ting from the Swedish Military Enlist-
ment data, which have the great advantage of providing accurate information about
all Swedish males at around the age of 18.5 Military enlistment was mandatory for
every male Swedish citizen at around the age of 18, and the data consists of tests on
health and physical status, cognitive ability as well as an assessment of the personal
characteristics of a conscript made by a licensed psychologist to provide an indication
of his mental ability. The principal aim of the Swedish Military Enlistment Battery
is to sort out individuals into di￿erent sections of the military system, with a view to
selecting those who are capable of performing more quali￿ed tasks.6
Achievement test scores on cognitive ability stem from general ability assessments
designed to capture spatial, verbal, logical and technical comprehension. These four
subtests are transformed into a general intelligence factor, which accounts for intel-
lectual ability and indicates the individual’s IQ. The non-cognitive ability measure
3Eide and Showalter (1999) also consider nonlinearity by implementing a quantile regression
approach on U.S. data to see whether additional schooling increases earnings di￿erently for sons at
the bottom of the earnings distribution compared to those at the top.
4For more on spline models, see Greene (2000), Chapter 7, p.121-122.
5In my sample, 0.01% enlisted at 16 years of age, 0.38% at 17 and 93,51% signed in at the age
of 18. Further, 5.59% joined the military at 19, 0.44% at 20, and 0.07 % and 0.01% enlisted at the
age of 21 and 22 respectively.
6The Swedish Military Enlistment test (Carlstedt, 2000) has been used in recent studies in returns
of schooling (Nordin, 2008) and di￿erences on labour market outcomes (Nordin and Rooth, 2009)
as well as returns to cognitives and non-cognitive ability (Lindqvist and Vestman, 2009); and also
on intergenerational association in IQ (Bj￿ orklund, Hederos Eriksson and J￿ antti, 2010).
6comes from information about the personal characteristics of the conscript, assessed
by a certi￿ed psychologist. For instance, a high score in the mental ability to function,
which is a reasonable measure of non-cognitive ability, is attributed to individuals who
excel in persistence, social skills and emotional stability.
The achievement test scores are normalized into a nine-point scale. The score
results are stanine (standard nine) distributed with a mean 5 and a standard deviation
of 2, where each score falls into a category instead of having a unique value.7 Stanines
are often used to categorize performance in certain tests, where a person’s exact score
is not as important as identifying groups of people with a similar performance score,
particularly those who are above or below average. I convert the stanine test scores of
IQ and mental ability, which originally might have been treated as continuous values
from 1 to 9, into categorical variables where each of the values is a dummy variable.
The Swedish Military Enlistment Battery also contains information on health and
physical status such as height and weight. In the analysis, health is measured using
the Body Mass Index (BMI), de￿ned as the weight in kilograms divided by the square
of height in metres. BMI at the age of 18 represents a plausible indication of future
BMI, which in turn serves as a proxy for health status.
The education and earnings variables are taken from population register data at
Statistics Sweden (SCB). Detailed information about the individual’s educational at-
tainment from the 1999 version of the Swedish education register is converted into
years of schooling.8 In addition to the level of education, I also use the ￿eld of edu-
cation in the analysis to shed light on a possible gender gap in educational outcomes,
which might re￿ect the dissimilarity in occupation in the labour market.9
The register data contain information about the income of all individuals. Since
earnings are a direct indication of the returns to education, health, cognitive and
non-cognitive abilities in the labour market, I ￿nd labour earnings to be a suitable
measure of income in this study.10 The son’s earnings are measured between the ages
of 32 and 38.11 To obtain a reasonable proxy for long-run earnings, I take the average
7Stanines (% of scores): 1 very poor (4%), 2 poor (7%), 3 considerably below average (12%), 4
slightly below average (17%), 5 average (20%), 6 slightly above average (17%), 7 considerably above
average (12%), 8 superior (7%), 9 very superior (4%).
8Their educational attainment, measured when they were 32 to 38 years old, is translated into
detailed measures of level and ￿eld of education. Starting with primary school, which is obligatory
at 6 or 7, I de￿ne seven levels of education with a corresponding total number of years: primary edu-
cation corresponds to 7 years, lower secondary education to 9 years, short and long upper secondary
education amount to 11 and 12 years, short and long university education amount to approximately
14 and 15.5 years and ￿nally PhD studies amount to 19 years.
9The ￿elds of education are: general education; arts, humanities and religion; teacher training;
administration, economics, social science and law; industry and technology; transport and commu-
nication; health; agriculture, forestry and ￿shing; service and defence.
10Earnings are de￿ned as a combination of wages, salaries and business income, including sickness
and parental leave bene￿ts.
11It has been shown that annual earnings at these ages are likely to re￿ect their long-run earnings
and yield the least unbiased indicator of lifetime earnings (B￿ ohlmark and Lindquist, 2006).
7over 1997-2002 log labour earnings for sons. Averaging over the log labour earnings
1970-1975 for fathers also helps to eliminate most of the transitory ￿uctuations.
3.2 Sample criteria and descriptives
I use a high-quality Swedish data set obtained from Statistics Sweden’s (SCB) reg-
isters, which consists of a 35-percent random sample of individuals born in Sweden
between 1961 and 1967. The most important advantage of this data is the multi-
generational nature of the population register, which makes it ideal for the study of
intergenerational association as it o￿ers a clear identi￿cation of children and makes
it easy to match them with their parents. In order to access an applicable measure
of skills and health, I combine sons’ data from the SCB register with data from the
Swedish Military Enlistment, which records all young Swedish men, at around the age
of 18 and their health status, physical ￿tness, cognitive and non-cognitive abilities.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. The sample size is restricted to indi-
viduals with over SEK 1000 in annual labour earnings, and the father’s age is limited
to 20-60 in order to avoid any possible e￿ects of outliers in the results. The sample
in the main analysis consists of 81,400 sons with a mean age of 34.8 in 1999. In the
family of origin, the father’s mean age in 1970 was 35.8 and his average of log labour
earnings was 12.25 (SEK 208,980). The corresponding mean average of the sons’ log
labour earnings was 12.39 implying a mean of SEK 240,400 for the level of earnings.
All earnings are expressed using the 2002 price levels.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Sons and Fathers
All sons Sons with more than 12 years
of education
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Age in 1999 34.8 1.9 32.0 38.0 34.8 1.9 32.0 38.0
Son’s log labour earnings 12.48 0.43 7.20 17.29 12.57 0.56 7.18 16.45
Years of schooling 12.1 2.1 7.0 19.0 14.1 1.5 12.0 19.0
Father’s age in 1970 35.8 6.9 20.0 60.0 35.3 6.7 20.0 60.0
Father’s log labour earnings 12.25 0.55 6.92 15.48 12.39 0.56 6.92 15.48
Sample Size 81,413 35,572
Earnings are averaged over 1997-2002 for sons, and over 1970-1975 for fathers, all in 2002 price levels.
Table 2 displays the relationship between the son’s earnings, education, his fa-
ther’s earnings and the di￿erent stanine categories of the son’s IQ, mental ability
and BMI. The association between the son’s log earnings and both his level of IQ
and mental ability is clearly a positive one. As expected, sons who belong to the
above average category of cognitive and non-cognitive skills tend to earn more in the
labour market. More years of schooling also correspond to higher earnings, even if
8the relationship between education and IQ and mental ability starts relatively ￿at in
the lower stanine categories and then slopes upwards towards the top. There is a pos-
itive link between the father’s earnings and the son’s level of IQ and mental ability.12
While cognitive and non-cognitive skills almost have the same e￿ect on the son’s
earnings and education, sons of fathers with high earnings tend to have a slightly
higher IQ compared to mental ability. In all cases, the relationship between son’s
BMI, log earnings and education is relatively ￿at in the middle stanine categories,
and forms an inverse U-shaped pattern.
Table 2: Relationship Between IQ, Mental ability, BMI, log Earnings and Education
Stanine values 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
IQ
Log earnings 12.05 12.16 12.23 12.28 12.35 12.44 12.54 12.62 12.70
Father’s log earnings 12.06 12.09 12.13 12.16 12.21 12.28 12.35 12.41 12.48
Years of education 10.2 10.4 10.74 11.04 11.7 12.5 13.3 14.0 14.7
Proportion 0.020 0.055 0.095 0.139 0.242 0.176 0.137 0.087 0.049
Mental ability
Log earnings 11.93 12.10 12.18 12.28 12.37 12.46 12.55 12.64 12.73
Father’s log earnings 12.16 12.14 12.15 12.19 12.21 12.27 12.35 12.42 12.46
Years of education 10.7 10.8 11.1 11.5 11.8 12.4 13.0 13.5 13.8
Proportion 0.007 0.034 0.083 0.174 0.263 0.212 0.147 0.064 0.015
BMI
Log earnings 12.27 12.36 12.40 12.42 12.42 12.40 12.39 12.37 12.32
Father’s log earnings 12.16 12.20 12.22 12.22 12.26 12.27 12.27 12.27 12.26
Years of education 11.3 11.7 12.0 12.0 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.1 12.0
Proportion 0.040 0.071 0.119 0.171 0.197 0.171 0.118 0.070 0.040
Sample Size 81,413
Stanines (% of scores): 1 very poor (4%), 2 poor (7%), 3 considerably below average (12%), 4 slightly below average
(17%), 5 average (20%), 6 slightly above average (17%), 7 considerably above average (12%), 8 superior(7%), 9
very superior (4%).
12Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the correlation between son’s years of schooling and IQ
is 0.57. Also, son’s years of schooling have a stronger correlation with his labour earnings than IQ,
0.31 and 0.27 respectively.
94 Empirical results
4.1 OLS results
4.1.1 Direct and indirect e￿ects
I start to estimate equations (2) and (3) from Section 2, with the aim of reporting
the direct and indirect e￿ects of a father’s earnings on those of his son. The indirect
e￿ects through the father’s investment in his son’s education, skills and health are
computed according to equation (9). The results are reported in Table 3.
It is important to bear in mind that the results from this kind of decomposition of
direct and indirect e￿ects are likely to be impaired by the correlation in the error terms
of the covariates. However, the analysis still illustrates the mechanisms underlying
the intergenerational transmission of earnings.
Since previous research has established that education is a primary predictor of
individual’s earnings potential, I ￿rst include the level of education in the father-son
earnings association, and estimate equation (3). The ￿rst row of Table 3 reports that
the direct e￿ect of the father’s earnings on those of the son’s is 0.090, and the indirect
e￿ect is 0.077. Accordingly, the sum of the direct and indirect e￿ect is 0.167, which
can be interpreted as the total e￿ect of the father’s earnings on the son’s earnings.
Hence, the magnitude of the indirect e￿ect implies that 46 percent of the total e￿ect
is mediated by the son’s education, and 54 percent can be accounted as the direct
e￿ect.
Next, I add the son’s IQ together with his level of education to the intergenera-
tional equation. The direct e￿ect of the father’s earnings on his son’s now shrinks to
0.083, while the indirect e￿ect through the level of education narrows down to 0.058
compared to 0.077, when only the son’s education is included in the estimation. The
indirect impact of the father’s earnings on his son’s through IQ is 0.025. From the
second row of Table 3, education appears to be a more important mediating variable
between the father-son earnings relationship as it accounts for 35 percent of the total
e￿ect compared to the 15 percent accounted by IQ.
The indirect e￿ect through education decreases further to 0.050, i.e. from 46
to 30 percent, when including cognitive and non-cognitive skills together along with
education in the father-son intergenerational earnings linkage. Now, the direct e￿ect
of a father’s earnings on son’s earnings is also smaller 0.078 compared to 0.090 when
education is the only mediating factor taken into account. The indirect e￿ect of the
father’s earnings via IQ is 0.019, while the corresponding e￿ect through mental ability
is 0.021. Hence, education still plays an important role as a channel through which
the intergenerational transmission of earnings persistence takes place, compared to
abilities. The level of education accounts for 30 percent of the earnings transference
between father and son, while IQ and mental ability contribute equally with about
11 percent of the earnings transmission.
10The last step in this exercise estimates equation (8), where also BMI is added to
the earlier list of mediating factors. Including BMI together with education, IQ and
mental ability in the intergenerational relationship does not alter the results much
compared to those from earlier speci￿cations. The direct e￿ect of the father’s earnings
on the son’s earnings remains the same, 0.077. The transmission of earnings across
generations through BMI is nearly nonexistent, namely 0.00045. This suggests that
either health is not a crucial transmitter of economic status between father and son,
or the son’s BMI at around 18 might not be accurate enough as an indication of his
future health.
Table 3: Direct and Indirect E￿ects of the Father’s Earnings on those of the Son’s
Direct E￿ect Indirect E￿ect through Total E￿ect
Education IQ Mental ability BMI
0.090 0.077 0.167
(54) (46)
0.083 0.058 0.025 0.167
(50) (35) (15)
0.078 0.050 0.019 0.021 0.167
(46) (30) (11) (12)
0.077 0.050 0.019 0.020 0.00045 0.167
(46) (30) (11) (12) (0.3)
Sample Size 81,413
Percentage in parentheses. Education is de￿ned as years of schooling, inferred from information on
level. The independent variable is the average of son’s log labour earnings 1997-2002 in 2002 price
levels.
The impact of education is reduced gradually with the inclusion of other po-
tential earnings transmitters. Specifying the intergenerational elasticity into parts
ascribed to the direct and indirect e￿ects of a father’s earnings on the son’s shows
that education is the most in￿uential mechanism. Meanwhile, the results also in-
dicate that education is extremely sensitive to the inclusion of other covariates in
the equation. Speci￿cally, considering education alone as a transmission mechanism
appears to overstate its impact in the transference of economic status. This could
very well be the case for the results in Eide and Showalter (1999), which report that
the OLS estimates of the father’s earnings decrease by nearly a third, from 0.34 to
0.24 when the son’s years of schooling are included in the equation. As my results in
the ￿rst row of Table 3 indicate, it is highly likely that the estimate of the impact of
education obtained partially contains some of the e￿ects that should be ascribed to
IQ and mental ability.
Although the source of the transmission of earnings is hard to determine, the
results of this analysis suggest that it partly re￿ects education, IQ, mental ability and
BMI. It is reasonable to argue that considering various factors together, as opposed
11to solely studying one factor in the analysis, gives a broader picture of the underlying
structure of the intergenerational transmission.
4.1.2 Changing the order of the mediating variables in the intergenera-
tional equation
I now change the order in which I enter the mediating variables into the intergenera-
tional equation. I start by estimating equation (1), a baseline speci￿cation with the
regression of the average of a son’s log labour earnings in 1997-2002 on those of his
father’s averaged over 1970-1975. Thereafter, to mimic previous research and with a
view to present the problem in disentangling the impact of one factor from another,
I estimate di￿erent speci￿cations where I include only one factor at a time in order
to assess their individual impact on the earnings persistence.
This exercise consists of estimating equation (3) in Section 2, only now I re-
place education alternating between IQ, mental ability and BMI. The OLS results
are presented in the ￿rst column of Table 4. The ￿rst speci￿cation estimates the
conventional father-son earnings relationship, and the last speci￿cation includes all
mediating factors simultaneously in order to gauge their combined e￿ect on the earn-
ings transmission. Therefore, the ￿rst and last speci￿cations in the ￿rst column of
Table 4 are expected to deliver the same results as their counterparts in Table 3.
From the ￿rst row and the ￿rst column of Table 4, the father-son elasticity is
0.165. Previous Swedish estimates for father-son elasticity range from 0.13 to 0.28.13
Possible explanations for the fact that my estimate of 0.165 belongs to the lower level
of this range could be the di￿erent sample criteria used and the alternative ways of
measuring long-run earnings in earlier studies on intergenerational mobility. As in
Table 3, including only the level of education in the intergenerational mobility model
reduces the father-son elasticity from 0.165 to 0.090, in other words, a 45-percent drop
in the estimates.14 Likewise, 29 percent of the earnings resemblance between fathers
and sons is attributed to cognitive ability measured by IQ, and 21 percent of the
earnings persistence is ascribed to mental ability. As before, health status seems to
have a negligible impact on the intergenerational relationship. In previous research on
the importance of health as a mechanism through which intergenerational economic
transmission takes place, Eriksson, Bratsberg and Raaum (2005) use a battery of
questions concerning whether the respondents in the Danish youth cohort data are
currently su￿ering from a list of illnesses such as hypertension, migraine or cancer.
Their results show that 28 percent of the relationship between a father’s and son’s
earnings is accounted for when self-reported health measures are included in the
analysis.
13See Bj￿ orklund, Clark, Edin, Fredriksson and Krueger (2005), chapter 8, for an overview of the
Swedish estimates in previous studies.
14Note that the father-son intergenerational elasticity here is 0.165 compared to the total e￿ect
of 0.167 in Section 4.1.1. The discrepancy may be caused either by rounding-o￿ errors or a possible
di￿erence in the underlying computation.
12Now to the last speci￿cation where all mediating factors are added simultaneously
in the model. The father-son elasticity decreases from 0.165 to 0.077. Together, the
level of education, IQ, mental ability to function and BMI account for 54 percent of
the inheritance of economic status. Combined, the e￿ect of all the mediating factors
(54 percent) is about half of the sum of the separate impact of education, IQ, mental
ability and BMI (96 percent).15
While the 54 percent refers to the e￿ect of all mediating factors on the father-
son transmission of earnings, the 96 percent says something about the covariance of
the variables used in the analysis. The sum of the separate e￿ects also depends on
the number of variables added together in the equation. The more covariates that
are considered in the analysis, the greater the covariance is, so this percentage share
could very well exceed 100 percent if the estimation encompasses more covariates
other than education, skills and BMI.
My results are in line with Blanden, Gregg and Macmillan (2007), who also ￿nd
that cognitive skills are more important in the transmission of economic status than
non-cognitive ability.16 Using British data, their results suggest that cognitive vari-
ables such as reading, maths, general ability scores at the age of 11 contribute to
27 percent of the earnings persistence, while variables outlining non-cognitive skills,
such as extroversion, locus of control and self-esteem account for 19 percent of the
intergenerational economic relationship. On the other hand, they ￿nd that cognitive
and non-cognitive variables together account for 32 percent of the earnings persis-
tence. It is interesting to note that these e￿ects do not usually add up to the total
share of earnings association when they are considered concomitantly in the same
intergenerational equation. Decomposing the e￿ects by means of the path analysis
model is complicated by the correlation between the error terms of the covariates
in the equations. Freedman (1992) also discusses the shortcomings of path analysis
model in the estimation of factors in￿uencing intergenerational relationship.
4.1.3 Using a predetermined measure of cognitive ability
Ideally, measuring IQ after the individual has completed the obligatory 9 years of
education and just before she starts upper secondary school, at the age of about 16,
would have given a more accurate e￿ect of IQ unin￿uenced by di￿erence in years of
education. However, since I only have access to test scores for men when they are
drafted for military service at the age of 18, I assess the impact of IQ by analyz-
ing a sample of 35,572 sons who have completed twelve years of schooling or more.
Descriptive statistics for this subsample are presented in the right-hand column of
Table 1. Imposing this condition is expected to give a cleaner e￿ect of education,
15See Table A2 in the Appendix for the percentage share of each factor’s impact on the intergen-
erational earnings persistence.
16Lindqvist and Vestman (2009) use the Swedish military data in the context of labour market
outcomes, and ￿nd that cognitive skills are more important determinant of earnings in the upper



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14apart from the in￿uence of cognitive ability. Tables 6 and 7 report the results of the
analysis using a predetermined measure of cognitive ability, which correspond to the
results in Tables 4 and 5 for the whole sample.
Starting from Table 5, the percentage share of the direct e￿ect of a father’s earn-
ings on his son’s earnings is somewhat higher, namely between 59 to 75 percent now
compared to 46-54 percent for the whole sample. In the ￿rst row where the level of
education is the only covariate included in the intergenerational model along with the
father’s earnings, the direct e￿ect of the father’s earnings on the son’s is 0.097, while
the indirect e￿ect through education is 0.033. The total e￿ect is now smaller than
before after isolating the impact of education, 0.130 compared to 0.167. Thus, the
persistence in earnings is lower for sons with a high level of education. It is reasonable
to assume that poorly educated sons are likely to have fathers with a low level of edu-
cation. Consequently, sons in the subsample may consist of those who experience an
upward mobility in education. This high degree of mobility in the subsample might
be overrated if the low-educated sons who were left out are likely to be those who still
have the same socioeconomic position as their fathers in the earnings distribution.
Now the level of education accounts for 25 percent of the transmission of economic
status between father and son. The subsample consists of sons with short and long
upper secondary education (11 and 12 years), those with short and long university
education (14 and 15.5 years) and those who have completed their PhD studies (19
years). The reduced impact of education might re￿ect the fact that there is relatively
little variation left of the education variable, since the last category with PhD studies
comprises only of a small group.
Table 5: Direct and Indirect E￿ects for Sons with More than 12 Years of Education
Direct E￿ect Indirect E￿ect through Total E￿ect
Education IQ Mental ability BMI
0.097 0.033 0.130
(75) (25)
0.088 0.027 0.015 0.130
(68) (21) (11)
0.077 0.025 0.012 0.018 0.130
(59) (19) (9) (13)
0.077 0.025 0.013 0.015 0.0002 0.130
(59) (19) (10) (11) (0.14)
Sample Size 35,572
Percentage in parentheses. Education is de￿ned as years of schooling, inferred from information on
level. The independent variable is the average of son’s log labour earnings 1997-2002 in 2002 price
levels.
15Entering IQ into the equation together with level of education only very slightly
decreases the indirect e￿ect of a father’s earnings on those of his son through edu-
cation, from 0.033 to 0.027. On the other hand, IQ now accounts for 11 percent of
the earnings transmission with an indirect e￿ect of 0.015. The importance of IQ as a
mediating factor remains nearly the same as in Table 3. The level of education, which
accounts for 21 percent of the earnings persistence, is still the leader in its function
as a channel through which a father’s earnings a￿ect his son’s economic outcome.
In the third row of Table 5, the magnitude of the indirect e￿ect of a father’s
earnings on his son’s through education decreases marginally to 0.025 after mental
ability together with education and IQ are included in the equation. Interestingly,
mental ability accounts for 13 percent of the transmission of economic status com-
pared to the 9 percent ascribed to IQ. The di￿erence in the indirect e￿ect through
IQ and mental ability, which amounted to 29 and 20 percent before, suggests that, in
this subsample, non-cognitive skills appear to make almost the same contribution as
cognitive ability to the father-son earnings persistence. This is slightly di￿erent from
the results in the previous section, where IQ contributes more to the transmission of
economic outcomes than mental ability.
Again, including BMI together with education, IQ and mental ability does not
alter the results. With all the factors accounted for in the intergenerational equation,
education remains a vital channel of earnings transmission, although its impact is
markedly reduced from 30 percent in the total sample to 19 percent now. Education
is followed by IQ and mental ability, which contribute equally to the generational
earnings persistence. The measure of health status seems to contribute little to the
economic relationship between father and son.
Now to the ￿rst column of Table 6, which displays the OLS results when the order
of the inclusion of the covariates are changed in the equation. The intergenerational
elasticity from the baseline speci￿cation is 0.128, which is noticeably smaller than its
counterparts, 0.165, in Table 5. Next, only 24 percent of this elasticity is ascribed to
the level of education, thus, the impact of education is less substantial than the 45
percent found earlier.
Restricting the sample to only include those who are well-educated is most likely
to reduce the variation in the education variable. Nevertheless, the level of education
still plays a central role in the earnings transmission. IQ and mental ability contribute
equally with 15 percent to the transmission of earnings, which implies that abilities
now contribute to a somewhat greater extent than before. Combined, the level of
education, IQ, mental ability and BMI together account for 40 percent of the earnings
persistence compared to 53 percent. Together, the corresponding sum of the e￿ects
is smaller now in Table 6, 54 percent compared to 95 percent in Table 5.17


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































174.2 Non-linearities: the spline regression results
Now I proceed using spline regression to explore whether sons of fathers at the top and
bottom of the conditional earnings distribution are di⁄erently mobile. The results
presented in the second column, to the right of the OLS estimates in Table 5 depict
some nonlinearity.
Looking at Figure 1, this nonlinearity is easily perceived by the distinct patterns
of a rising intergenerational elasticity from the 25th to the 50th percentile of the son￿ s
earnings distribution, and a decreasing one between the 50th-75th percentiles. The
slopes are particularly di⁄erent for sons of middle-class fathers and those who belong
to the 75th-90th percentiles of the earnings distribution. This is especially evident
when all transmission mechanisms are taken into account in the same intergenera-
tional equation, as the slope of the spline regression looks nearly half as steep as in
the baseline speci￿cation. Likewise, when education is included in the estimation, the
spline regression slope becomes relatively ￿ at compared to the baseline speci￿cation
and the speci￿cations which account separately for IQ, mental ability, and health.
Figure 1: Spline results of the impact of mediating variables on the father-son earnings
persistence
18Returning to Table 4, the degree of the intergenerational linkage is somewhat
weak at the lower end of the distribution, yet the generational persistence rises in the
middle and manifest a downward tendency towards the top in an inverted S shaped.
The results show that fathers with earnings between the top 0.10 and 0.25 percentiles
have a high propensity to transfer their economic position to their sons. A coe￿cient
estimate of 0.388 implies that a 10-percent earnings di￿erential among high earners
translates into about 4-percent di￿erential among sons. The average persistence is
less than half, namely 1.6 percent. Hence the nonlinear approach denotes the presence
of a higher earnings persistence compared to its log-linear counterpart.
The level of education contributes as much as 62 percent to the earnings persis-
tence for sons of fathers belonging to the 50th and the 75th percentiles. The decline in
the elasticity estimate when education is included in the equation, is also important
for the upper middle classes, between the 75th and the 90th percentiles. Furthermore,
including IQ in the estimation suggests that cognitive ability has a pronounced im-
pact in terms of a 45-percent decrease in the intergenerational earnings persistence.
In their study on the impact of skills on labour market outcomes, Linqvist and Vest-
man (2009) also ￿nd that IQ is essentially important for individuals who have wages
above the median, and that non-cognitive skills have an impact on job acquisition for
those at the lower end of the distribution. By and large, mental ability and BMI have
the least impact on the persistence of earnings, compared to the level of education
and IQ.
On the whole, the spline regression results show that the intergenerational elas-
ticity increases with the father’s earnings, so there is a high persistence in earnings,
and education seems to be the propelling force driving the results. The higher inter-
generational dependence in earnings at the upper end of the earnings distribution is
consistent with previous results for Sweden where Bj￿ orklund, Roine and Waldenstr￿ om
(2008) ￿nd that the intergenerational mobility decreases within the top percentiles
of the earnings distribution.
Table 6 present the spline regression results for those who have completed twelve
years of schooling or more. Imposing this condition tends to reinforce the role of
education in the transmission of economic status from father to son. Looking at the
￿rst row of Table 6, the spline regression estimates are now smaller at the lower end of
the distribution, and the magnitude of the intergenerational elasticity also decreases
modestly at the top. As for the combined impact of all the mediating factors taken
together in the last row of Table 6, the estimates are greater compared to those in Ta-
ble 5, especially at the top of the son’s earnings distribution.The education estimates
19in the second row of Table 6 also become smaller at the 10th to 50th percentiles,
but increase in magnitude towards the top. The intergenerational elasticity estimate
decreases slightly in Table 6, from the 25th-50th to the 90th-95th, with IQ as a co-
variate, yet the high dependence in economic outcomes remains stable at the very
top. All in all, the spline results conditional on having 12 years of schooling or more
suggest a relatively greater mobility at the lower part of the distribution and more
dependence in earnings in the top percentiles.
4.3 Comparison between sons and daughters
Since the corresponding information in the test scores to the data from the Swedish
military data is unavailable for daughters, I resort to a comparison between sons
and daughters, using education. In addition to level of education, I also use ￿eld of
education in this analysis.
It is a well-established fact that men and women di￿er greatly in their choice
of educational ￿eld. However, previous research on the role of education in the
intergerarational transmission of earnings has mainly taken years of schooling rather
than ￿eld of education into consideration (e.g. Eide and Showalter, 1999, Blanden,
Gregg and Macmillan, 2007). Moreover, prior studies have revealed the existence of
occupational gender division in Sweden (Meyersson-Milgrom, Petersen and Snartland,
2001), and that the gender wage gap might re￿ect the fact that men and women have
di￿erent jobs (Albrecht, Bj￿ orklund and Vroman, 2003). The ￿eld of education is
meant to capture the gender di￿erence in the choice of subject of interest at school,
which should re￿ect the dissimilarity in occupation in the labour market.
To begin with, Table A3 displays descriptive statistics for a sample of 81,413
daughters. Tables 1 and A3 show that the mean of the daughter’s log labour earnings
is 11.94, the corresponding ￿gure for sons is 12.39 implying a mean of SEK 153,277
and SEK 240,386 respectively. The standard deviation of the log earnings is higher
for daughters, 0.58 compared to 0.43 for sons, while the variation of fathers’ log
earnings is nearly the same for both sons and daughters, 0.55 and 0.54 respectively.
All earnings are expressed using 2002 price levels. Not surprisingly, daughters have
on average more years of schooling compared to sons, 12.3 for daughters and 12.1 for
sons.
I ￿rst comment the OLS results in the ￿rst column of Table A4 and then pro-
ceed to those from the spline regression. The results for daughters are reported in
the upper half of Table A4, and those for sons are presented in the lower half. The
elasticity of the son’s earnings with respect to those of father’s is 0.165 and the cor-
responding elasticity is slightly lower for daughters, namely 0.123. Previous research
also ￿nd that daughters are somewhat more mobile intergenerationally compared to
sons (￿ Osterberg, 2000, Hirvonen, 2008). When taking level of education into account
separately in the father-daughter intergenerational regression, the elasticity estimate
decreases by half, from 0.123 to 0.062. This striking fall in the coe￿cient estimate
20implies that education also constitutes an important mediating variable in the earn-
ings linkage between father and daughter. This might mean that nearly half of the
degree of earnings transmission between fathers and daughters is mediated by edu-
cation. For sons, 45 percent of father-son earnings resemblance can be accredited to
education.
Now to the third row of Table A4. Adding the ￿eld of education contributes little
to the dependence of outcomes between fathers and sons. There is only a modest
fall in the magnitude of the estimates when the ￿eld of education of the daughter is
entered into the equation.
The results of the comparison between sons and daughters, with respect to educa-
tion, suggests in particular, that the length of education plays a more in￿uential role
than the chosen ￿eld of education, as far as accounting for the persistence of earnings
is concerned. Therefore, I do not ￿nd evidence in favour of the gender gap in edu-
cational outcomes in the intergenerational earnings persistence. Instead my results
could just as well suggest that gender di￿erences in choice of ￿eld of education may
also result from di￿erent labour market expectations.
Taken together, the results of the comparison show that education has almost
the same e￿ect on the inheritance of inequality for sons and daughters. On the one
hand, daughters’ earnings are slightly less dependent on fathers’ earnings, the degree
of persistence in earnings is 0.167 for fathers-daughters compared to 0.123 for fathers-
sons. On the other hand, the economic status of fathers has an impact on daughters’
earnings through education to a higher propensity compared to sons.
5 Conclusions
This study uses a large and representative sample to explore what lies behind the
intergenerational earnings persistence. The main purpose is to investigate whether
it is possible to distinguish between the extent to which various factors such as edu-
cation, cognitive and non-cognitive skills, and health contribute to the persistence of
economic status across generations.
The ￿rst part of the analysis consists of estimating a recursive model in which pa-
ternal earnings have a direct impact on the son’s earnings, but also via other factors
such as level of education, IQ, mental ability and BMI. This kind of decomposition
of the direct and indirect e￿ects relies on the assumption that the error terms in the
structural equations must be uncorrelated. However, there are strong beliefs that in
practice, these mediating factors are positively correlated with each other and with
some unobserved factors. As expected, I ￿nd that the impact of education on the
earnings transmission process decreases gradually with the inclusion of other poten-
tial transmitters of earnings. Quantifying the intergenerational elasticity into parts
ascribed to the direct and indirect e￿ects implies that education is the most in￿uen-
tial mechanism. Meanwhile, the results also points towards the fact that education is
21sensitive to the inclusion of other covariates and the order in which they are included
in the equation.
The second part of the analysis uses a predetermined measure of cognitive ability
in the estimation to further assess the role of education beyond the impact of the
cognitive ability. The level of education remains the most central channel through
which earnings transmission takes place although its impact is weaker in the results
for sons with twelve or more years of education.
Another contribution of this paper is to investigate whether the role of education,
skills and health di￿er in various parts of the earnings distribution. The spline regres-
sion results corroborate previous ￿ndings on notable nonlinearity in the father-son
earnings resemblance. When adding the di￿erent transmitters separately, the e￿ect of
a father’s earnings on those of his son has an impact mostly through level of education
and IQ, especially in the upper middle categories of the father’s distribution.
An additional analysis of the comparison between sons and daughters with regard
to education suggests that a daughter’s earnings are slightly less dependent on her
father’s earnings. Also, the inclusion of educational ￿eld in the analysis suggests
that the level rather than ￿eld of education plays an important role in the transfer
of economic position. Overall, education has more or less the same e￿ect on the
inheritance of inequality for daughters and sons, although its impact is slightly more
pronounced for daughters than for sons.
My analysis highlights speci￿cally that it is di￿cult to distinguish between the
mechanisms behind the intergenerational earnings association. While it is certainly
possible to pick out di￿erent mediating factors, considering one factor at a time can
lead to a di￿erent interpretation of the results than accounting for a number of factors
simultaneously in the same equation. The separate impact of one factor at a time
tends to be much greater, presumably because the estimate is likely to capture the
potential e￿ect of other factors not taken into account in the estimation.
Ultimately, the problem of omitted variable bias is likely to impair the results,
yet including more covariates in the equation should also decrease the degree of the
total inconsistency in the estimates. Normally, the more variables are involved in the
equation, the higher the propensity for them to net out the e￿ect of bias. Despite
these concerns, my results still present a useful upper bound to the true impact of
these factors on the persistence of earnings.
All in all, although it is not possible to de￿nitely discern one mechanism from
another, we can make progress in the area, and learn more from below the surface
when studying various factors together in the same analysis instead of focusing on
one single factor as the sole source of the transmission of earnings persistence across
generations.
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25A Appendix
Table A1: Correlation Between Earnings, Education, Skills and BMI
All Sons Sons with more than









IQ 0.569 0.270 0.305 0.186
Mental ability 0.351 0.262 0.126 0.227
Years of schooling 1.000 0.306 1.000 0.192
Log earnings 0.306 1.000 0.192 1.000
Sample Size 81,413 35,572









Elasticity 0.165 0.090 0.117 0.131 0.163 0.077
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Percent 45 29 21 1 53
Sons with 12 or more years of education N=35,572
Elasticity 0.128 0.097 0.109 0.109 0.128 0.077
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Percent 24 15 15 0 40
The independent variable is the average of son’s log labour earnings 1997-2002 in 2002 price levels
Table A3: Descriptive Statistics for Daughters and Fathers
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Age in 1999 34.8 1.9 32.0 38.0
Daughters’ log labour earnings 11.94 0.58 7.22 15.54
Years of schooling 12.3 2.0 7.0 19.0
Father’s age in 1970 35.8 6.9 20.0 60.0
Father’s log labour earnings 12.25 0.54 6.94 14.75
Sample Size 82,399
Earnings are averaged over 1997-2002 for daughterss, and over 1970-1975 for
fathers, all in 2002 price levels.
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